

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0355

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0190

EXDIS NOFORN

FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM STANLEY R. RESOR

DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BASIC DECISIONS REQUIRED FOR AUGUST 1974:

MESSAGE NUMBER 3 - POLICY CHOICES IN DETAIL

REF: A) MBFR VIENNA 0188

B) MBFR VIENNA 0189

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PRESENTS DETAILS OF
THE TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE MBFR TALKS
SUMMARIZED IN MBFR VIENNA 0188. IN BRIEF, COURSE ONE
IS TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING
OBJECTIVES INTACT, BUT TO BRING THE IMPORTANT NUCLEAR
ELEMENT INTO THE PRESENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING
POSITION. COURSE TWO IS TO CUT BACK ALLIED
OBJECTIVES AND TO AIM FOR AN ABBREVIATED FIRST

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PHASE AGREEMENT. THE DELEGATION RECOMMENDS ADOPTION

OF COURSE ONE. IN ANY CASE, A DECISION IS REQUIRED
IN AUGUST. END SUMMARY.

I. COURSE ONE

2. PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION:

A. THE EAST WOULD BE TOLD AROUND THE END OF OCTOBER
THAT THE WEST MIGHT BE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO INCLUDE
A PORTION OF US NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN PHASE ONE US
WITHDRAWALS IF THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT
IN PHASE ONE THERE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRICAL
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS.

B. SUCH A FORMULA COULD BE PUT FORWARD EITHER BY
THE SECRETARY, POSSIBLY DURING HIS NEXT VISIT TO MOSCOW,
OR IN VIENNA. IN EITHER CASE, APPROPRIATE CONSULTATION
WITH THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

C. IN GIVING A SIGNAL OF POSSIBLE ALLIED
WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE NUCLEARS, THE ALLIES WOULD NOT
PUT FORWARD THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF POSSIBLE US
NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS. THIS WOULD BE DONE LATER,
AFTER A SATISFACTORY SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE NUCLEAR
SIGNAL HAD BEEN OBTAINED, POSSIBLY IN THE SUBSEQUENT
ROUND IN VIENNA. SUCH A RESPONSE SHOULD CONSIST OF
AN INDICATION OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER
SERIOUSLY A SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRICAL WITHDRAWAL
OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS. BEFORE
PROCEEDING BEYOND THIS POINT, FURTHER GUIDANCE
FROM WASHINGTON WOULD BE NEEDED.

3. NEGOTIATING BACKGROUND

A. THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY INDICATED THAT
THEY ARE UNWILLING SERIOUSLY TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS
IF THESE ARE CONFINED SOLELY TO SUBSTANTIALLY
ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. ALTHOUGH
THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS
MIGHT SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE
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SEQUENCE OF NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS
(PHASING), AND WITH REGARD TO THE INCLUSION OF AIR
AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE, THERE HAS
BEEN NO GIVE IN SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT REDUCTIONS
BE "EQUITABLE" AND REFLECT PRECISELY THE PRESENT
OVERALL CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THESE
REQUIREMENTS APPEAR TO BE THE TOP SOVIET PRIORITY
IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME.

B. THE WEST, FOR ITS PART, ATTACHES THE HIGHEST VALUE TO OBTAINING ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS IN PHASE ONE AND EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, WHICH WILL REQUIRE FURTHER EASTERN ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN PHASE TWO.

C. FOR THE WEST TO BRING THE EAST TO BARGAIN SERIOUSLY ON EASTERN ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, THE WEST MUST OFFER TO THE EAST A WESTERN FORCE REDUCTION PACKAGE WHICH ARGUABLY BALANCES OFF THE GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS SOUGHT FROM THE EAST AND WHICH WOULD PLACE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN MAKE THE CASE AT HOME THAT THIS PACKAGE WOULD PRESERVE THE OVERALL CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA.

D. IN VIEW OF SOVIET INSISTENCE ON EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT THE ALLIES CAN OBTAIN SIGNIFICANTLY ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE ONE WITHOUT THE USE OF OPTION 3. ONCE THE WEST HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE REDUCTION AREA, IT CAN ARGUE THAT, ALTHOUGH IT DOES SEEK TO CHANGE THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE STABILITY, IT IS WILLING AT THE SAME TIME TO WITHDRAW US NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS AN OFFSET AND THUS MAINTAIN UNCHANGED THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE AREA. PROBABLY THE WHOLE CONTENT OF OPTION 3 WILL BE REQUIRED TO BRING THE EAST TO CONSIDER GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE AS ASYMMETRICAL AS THOSE PROPOSED IN PHASE ONE BY THE ALLIES. AND IF THE SOVIETS COULD BE INDUCED THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION 3 TO ACCEPT ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE ONE, IT
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WOULD PROBABLY THEN BE EASIER TO OBTAIN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0190

EXDIS/NOFORN

FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM STANLEY R. RESOR

DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

FROM US REP MBFR

4. ARGUMENTS FOR COURSE ONE. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF COURSE ONE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THIS APPROACH COULD LAY THE GROUND WORK FOR ACHIEVING SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BY NEXT SPRING. EVEN IF THE SOVIETS ARE NOT MOVING DURING THE FALL IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, TO ADVANCE THIS PROPOSAL COULD PREPARE THE GROUND FOR SUBSEQUENT SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT WHICH COULD ENABLE US TO MEET THE TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR PROGRESS.

B. THE FACT THAT NATO'S MBFR POSITION AS ADVANCED TO THE EAST IS SO ONE-SIDED PERMITS THE SOVIETS TO REJECT IT WITHOUT INCURRING THE ONUS OF BEING UNWILLING TO REACH CONCRETE AGREEMENTS. MAKING THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL WILL PROVIDE A VALID TEST, ABSENT THUS FAR, OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MBFR PROJECT. MOREOVER, WHEN NATO HAS A MORE REALISTIC MBFR POSITION ON THE TABLE, THE WEST WILL
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BE ABLE TO DIRECTLY TAKE THE POSITION WITH THE SOVIETS THAT CONTINUED REJECTION OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL SHOWS A LACK OF INTEREST IN SUBSTANCE AND THAT THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE LACKS REAL CONTENT AS REGARDS MILITARY SECURITY.

C. WITHOUT THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL, THE EAST WILL PROBABLY

REMAIN UNWILLING TO ADDRESS SERIOUSLY THE ALLIED PHASE ONE REDUCTION PROGRAM, WHICH CALLS FOR THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW NEARLY TWO AND A HALF TIMES AS MANY MEN AS THE US, AND TO WITHDRAW 1700 TANKS WHILE THE US WITHDRAWS NONE. ADDITIONALLY, ANY MOVES THE ALLIES MIGHT MAKE IN THE FUTURE TO DEVELOP OTHER ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN PROGRAM WOULD LIKELY RECEIVE BETTER CONSIDERATION FROM THE EAST IF THE OVERALL REDUCTION CONTEXT IN WHICH SUCH MOVES ARE MADE IS REGARDED BY THE EAST AS A MORE EQUITABLE ONE.

D. THE ALLIES WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO STONEWALL THIS FALL IN ORDER TO SHOW TOUGHNESS IN THE FACE OF SOVIET LACK OF MOVEMENT. TO BE CARRIED OUT EFFECTIVELY, STONEWALLING HAS TO BE BASED ON A REASONABLE AND REALISTIC POSITION.

E. IF WE MOVE TO THE RECOMMENDED POSITION, THEN, WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS EASTERN MOVEMENT, IT WILL BE EASIER TO MOBILIZE PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIED POSITION.

F. AN OFFER TO INCLUDE TACTICAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS IN THE ALLIED POSITION MAY HELP TO BROADEN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO FORESTALL POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THESE WEAPONS UNILATERALLY. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY OF THOSE TESTIFYING BEFORE THE SYMINGTON COMMITTEE STRONGLY URGED REDUCTIONS IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COURSE ONE:

A. UNTIL THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN SOME WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON MBFR, INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR SIGNAL MAY UNPRODUCTIVELY EXPEND ALLIED NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

B. IT COULD TAKE SO LONG TO OBTAIN ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL THAT IT CANNOT BE USED IN TIME TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT IN THE SPRING. HENCE SOME OTHER ACTION DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THIS END SHOULD BE SOUGHT. SOME ALLIES WILL TAKE THE VIEW THAT NO SIGNAL SHOULD BE GIVEN UNTIL
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THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY READY TO MOVE IN MBFR. IN ANY EVENT, THE ALLIES WILL DESIRE A DISCUSSION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OF THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND THE TACTICS OF PUTTING FORWARD THAT CONTENT BEFORE AGREEING THAT THE SIGNAL SHOULD BE MADE -- AND SOME MAY EVEN CLAIM THERE SHOULD BE PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS.

C. IT MAY BE INADVISABLE TO SEPARATE OFF THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL FROM THE REMAINDER OF OPTION 3 AND TO USE IT IN ADVANCE OF FULL COMPLETION OF THE DECISION PROCESS WITHIN THE USG AND THE CONSULTATION PROCESS IN NATO ON THE CONTENT OF OPTION 3 AND THE OVERALL TACTICS OF INTRODUCING ITS DETAILS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

A. THE US MAY WISH TO DEAL WITH THE FBS ISSUE IN SALT IN PART BY TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT REDUCTIONS IN SOME TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD BE CONSIDERED IN MBFR. IF SUCH A MOVE WERE MADE FIRST IN SALT IT IS CLEAR THAT AN MBFR NUCLEAR SIGNAL WOULD HAVE NO VALUE AS A BARGAINING CHIP ON ITS OWN, WHEN INTRODUCED SUBSEQUENTLY IN MBFR. THE SIGNAL COULD NOT BE USED TO OBTAIN SOVIET ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS IN MBFR.

B. TO TELL THE SOVIETS IN SALT THAT WE ARE WILLING TO REDUCE CERTAIN FBS IN CENTRAL EUROPE BEFORE MAKING THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL IN MBFR WOULD HAVE A FURTHER DISADVANTAGE FOR MBFR. IT WOULD MAKE IT APPARENT TO THE SOVIETS IN ADVANCE THAT A WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER IN MBFR WOULD INCLUDE F-4'S AND PERSINGS, SINCE THOSE ARE THE ONLY WEAPONS IN THE MBFR REDUCTION AREA THAT WOULD QUALIFY AS FBS. THIS WOULD VIRTUALLY PRECLUDE THE POSSIBLE TACTIC OF HOLDING THE F-4'S IN RESERVE IN MBFR.

C. FOR THOSE REASONS, IT MAKES SENSE IN TERMS OF MBFR NEGOTIATING LOGIC TO GIVE THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL FIRST IN THE MBFR CONTEXT. THIS WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE WEST COULD OBTAIN SOMETHING OF VALUE IN MBFR IN EXCHANGE FOR THE SIGNAL. IT WOULD ALSO PERMIT GREATER TACTICAL FREEDOM AS TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ACTUAL ELEMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR PACKAGE LATER ON. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVING THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL FIRST IN
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MBFR WOULD NOT APPEAR TO UNDERCUT THE LOGIC OF SUBSEQUENTLY TELLING THE SOVIETS IN SALT THAT THEIR INTEREST IN FBS WAS BEING PARTIALLY MET IN MBFR.

D. IT MAY OF COURSE BE FELT THAT PRIOR INTRODUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL INTO THE MBFR TALKS MIGHT TO SOME EXTENT REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS IN SALT OF A US OFFER TO DEAL IN MBFR WITH THAT PORTION OF FBS LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

II. COURSE TWO

7. PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION. COURSE TWO SEEKS TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR REACHING SPECIFIC AGREEMENT BY THE LATE SPRING OF 1975 THROUGH CUTTING BACK PRESENT ALLIED OBJECTIVES BY DEFINING AN AGREEMENT OF LIMITED SCOPE WHICH WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST.

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0190

EXDIS NOFORN

FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM STANLEY R. RESOR

DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

FROM US REP MBFR

8. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF AN ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR AN
ABBREVIATED AGREEMENT WOULD BE:

A. TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION.

B. THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BE LIMITED TO WITHDRAWALS
OF STATIONED FORCES. THE SECOND PHASE WOULD COVER
REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCES OF COUNTRIES INSIDE THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS AS WELL AS FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF STATIONED
FORCES.

C. THE FIRST PHASE WOULD CONSIST MAINLY OF US AND
SOVIET MANPOWER WITHDRAWALS. SUGGESTED FIGURES ARE
15,000 US AND 34,000 SOVIETS, ABOUT ONE-HALF OF THE
PRESENT ALLIED OBJECTIVE.

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D. THERE WOULD BE A REDUCTION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF UK AND CANADIAN FORCES, SAY 1,000 UK AND 500 CANADIAN TROOPS IN ORDER TO MEET IN A MINIMUM WAY SOVIET DEMANDS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE. INCLUSION OF THESE FORCES WOULD BE ESTABLISH A RATIONALE WHICH MEETS SOVIET DEMANDS FOR EQUAL TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY SITUATED FORCES. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INCLUDE A DISCLAIMER THAT THESE UK AND CANADIAN WITHDRAWALS DID NOT ESTABLISH NATIONAL CEILINGS, OR THE ALLIES WOULD NOT AGREE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

E. PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO REDUCE BY INDIVIDUALS OR UNITS.

F. AT LEAST NINETY PERCENT OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN GROUND FORCES BUT UP TO TEN PERCENT COULD BE IN AIR MANPOWER. INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IS INTENDED AS AN INDUCEMENT FOR THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES.

G. REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS WOULD BE DEFERRED TO THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION IN ORDER TO SIMPLIFY THE NEGOTIATING TASK. THERE WOULD BE NO FREEZE ON ARMAMENTS SO THAT NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED.

H. AGREEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES AND VERIFICATION WOULD BE DEFERRED TO PHASE TWO.

I. THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN THE SECOND PHASE ON A COMMON CEILING.

J. THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO AGREE TO A FREEZE OF SPECIFIED LIMITED DURATION ON THE OVERALL LEVELS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA BETWEEN PHASES. THE SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT AN ENDURING CEILING ON WESTERN EUROPEAN, ESPECIALLY BUNDESWEHR, FORCES.

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9. DISCUSSION

WE HAVE ATTEMPTED, IN PUTTING TOGETHER THE ELEMENTS OF COURSE TWO, TO DEFINE THE MAXIMUM WE THINK THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO ACCEPT IN A TRUNCATED FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

THIS NECESSARILY INVOLVES MAKING CERTAIN WESTERN CONCESSIONS WHICH WE HAVE HELD TO THE MINIMUM WE CONSIDER REALISTIC. EVEN SO, WE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT SUBSTANTIALLY ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IS NOT INCLUDED UNDER THE COURSE TWO APPROACH BECAUSE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT CAN REALISTICALLY BE ACHIEVED WITH THE LEVERAGE APPROPRIATE FOR SUCH AN ABBREVIATED FIRST PHASE.

10. ARGUMENTS FOR COURSE TWO:

A. IT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR A NEGOTIATING PROGRAM WHICH CAN LEAD TO SPECIFIC AGREEMENT BY THE LATE SPRING OF 1975; THE AGREEMENT COULD BE PRESENTED AS A BEGINNING FROM WHICH MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS CAN BE READILY NEGOTIATED IN A SECOND PHASE.

B. IT WOULD ESTABLISH THE PRECEDENT FOR ASYMMETRICAL STEP ON THE ROAD TO ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

C. IT DIVIDES IN HALF THE NUMBER OF SOVIET FORCES TO BE TAKEN OUT IN THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS ON THIS GROUND. WE CONCLUDE FROM SOVIET EMPHASIS ON A LIMITED FIRST STEP AGREEMENT THAT ONE SOVIET MOTIVE AMONG OTHERS IS TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF THE FIRST SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IN ORDER TO COPE WITH INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO FORCE REDUCTIONS AND TO REDUCE THE DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWALS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

D. IT WOULD DEFER TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION SUCH DIFFICULT ISSUES AS (A) HOW TO DEFINE A REDUCTION OF INDIGENOUS FORCES WITHIN THE AREA AS DISTINGUISHED FROM WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES; (B) REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS; (C) AGREEMENT ON UNITS TO BE
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REDUCED; (D) STABILIZING MEASURES AND VERIFICATION; (E) THE ISSUE OF ESTABLISHING CEILINGS ON ARMAMENTS REMAINING IN THE AREA AFTER REDUCTIONS.

E. IN THE EVENT OF EASTERN AGREEMENT, THE ALLIES WILL HAVE PRESERVED THE VALUABLE BARGAINING LEVERAGE OF NUCLEARS FOR A SECOND PHASE.

F. ASIDE FROM ABSENCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE SOME ATTRACTION FOR THE NATO ALLIES IN VIEW OF THE SCALED-DOWN SIZE OF US WITHDRAWALS AND THE DEFERRAL OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS TO PHASE II.

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0190

EXDIS/NOFORN

FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM STANLEY R. RESOR

DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY SCHLESINGER

FROM US REP MBFR

11. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COURSE TWO:

A. TO OBTAIN THE CUT-BACK FIRST PHASE WOULD CONSUME MUCH OF THE LEVERAGE THE WEST HAS AVAILABLE FOR THE OVERALL MBFR NEGOTIATION. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, PLUS POSTPONEMENTA TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION OF MAJOR WESTERN OBJECTIVES, ESPECIALLY THE COMMON CEILING AND REDUCTION OF THE TANK DISPARITY, BUT ALSO SUCH MATTERS AS ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND VERIFICATION, MEANS THAT IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES LATER. BY DEFINITION, DEFERRING AN OBJECTIVE MEANS GIVING IT SECONDARY STATUS.

B. IT IS ILLOGICAL TO CUT BACK NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES BEFORE THE ALLIES HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR FULL POSITION AND HAVE ASCERTAINED WHETHER IT WILL SUCCEED.

C. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE WESTERNEUROPEANS

WILL NOT BE READY TO ENTER ON A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

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WITH THE SOVIET UNION RESULTING IN LIMITATIONS OF THEIR FUTURE FREEDOM OF ACTION UNLESS THE COMMON CEILING IS A PART OF IT AND THAT THEY WOULD PREFER UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWALS AND EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE COMMON CEILING. WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE READY A CONVINCING EXPLANATION OF HOW WE PROPOSE TO ACHIEVE THE COMMON CEILING IN THE SECOND PHASE.

D. AN AGREEMENT OF THIS KIND MAY BE CRITICIZED IN THE WEST AS PURE ATMOSPHERICS. IN PARTICULAR, THE SMALL SIZE OF THE REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD MAINTAINING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF US FORCES IN EUROPE. THIS COURSE MIGHT ALSO BE CRITICIZED AS AN ALLIED DEFEAT BECAUSE ITS CONTENT IS SO SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE SOVIET FIRST STEP PROPOSAL.

E. THE SOVIETS STRONGLY OPPOSE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. FOR THIS REASON ALONE, THERE WOULD BE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GAINING THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL. TO DO SO, WE MAY HAVE TO MEET SOVIET DEMANDS FOR BINDING COMMITMENT TO REDUCE NUCLEARS AND THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE SECOND PHASE, DETAILED AS TO TIME AND AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS. NEGOTIATING FIRM COMMITMENTS ON THESE POINTS COULD BE EXTREMELY TIME CONSUMING.

F. WHILE CANADA MIGHT COME ALONG, THERE COULD BE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING THE UK TO REDUCE SEPARATELY FROM ITS PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AT A TIME WHEN UK AND EUROPEAN OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY NERVOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF UK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE COMMON MARKET.

G. THIS COURSE ENTAILS THE RISK THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PUSH FOR AN OVERALL FREEZE ON ARMAMENTS, WHICH, IF AGREED, WOULD FREEZE PACT SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND COULD SERIOUSLY LIMIT ALLIED CAPACITY TO MAKE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.

H. THE ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WOULD MEAN THE USG HAD DEPARTED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF INSISTING THAT ANY SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS BE CLEARLY VERIFIABLE.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

12. WE RECOMMEND THAT:

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A. THE DECISION BE MADE TO PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST
BY LATE OCTOBER THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL DESCRIBED IN COURSE
ONE.

B. THAT A DECISION BE REACHED IN EARLY AUGUST, SO
THAT, REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER COURSE IS CHOSEN, THE
DELEGATION WILL BE IN A POSITION TO PLAN ITS TACTICS TO GIVE
MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO IT IN THE FALL SESSION OF THE TALKS IN VIENNA.

13. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT:

C. OPTION 3, AS PRESENTED TO THE ALLIES LAST JULY,
BE MAINTAINED AS DEFINING THE CONTENT OF THE NUCLEAR WITH-
DRAWALS US WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE IN SUPPORT OF THE
ALLIED PHASE ONE REDUCTION OBJECTIVE; AND

D. THAT WASHINGTON MOVE TOWARD PROMPT DECISION ON AN OVERALL
CONCEPT OF THE TACTICS TO BE USED FOR INTRODUCING THE ACTUAL
CONTENT OF OPTION 3 VIS-A-VIS THE EAST. DECISIONS AND COMPLETION
OF DETAILS CAN BE LEFT TO A LATER POINT.

14. WASHINGTON DECISIONS ON THESE LAST TWO
POINTS WILL BE NECESSARY REQUIREMENT FOR OBTAINING
ALLIED AGREEMENT TO MAKING THE NUCLEAR SIGNAL.

15. AS SOON AS THESE DECISIONS ARE REACHED, WE RECOMMEND THAT
WASHINGTON MOVE TOWARD SEEKING ALLIED AGREEMENT TO ITS
SPECIFIC POSITIONS, STARTING WITH THE FRG AND UK. OUR
FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TACTICS OF INTRODUCING
THE CONTENT OF OPTION 3 ARE CONTAINED IN A SEPARATE
MESSAGE. RESOR

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